How Do Coalitions Break Down? An Alternative View

Explore a dynamic theory of coalition breakdown in this 47-minute seminar from the Dynamic Games and Applications series. Delve into an alternative perspective on how coalitions disintegrate, presented by Benteng Zou from the University of Luxembourg. Examine the proposed model, which assumes non-optimal payoff sharing rules within coalitions and initial player behavior as if the coalition were permanent. Investigate the endogenous exit problem when sharing rules are time-invariant and renegotiation is costly or impossible. Learn about the characterization of solutions in a linear-quadratic framework with endogenous splitting time. Discover key findings, including the observation that splitting countries are often those who previously benefited most from the coalition. Understand the conditions for coalition stability based on initial pollution levels and payoff share distributions. Gain insights into this collaborative research effort with Raouf Boucekkine, Carmen Camacho, and Weihua Ruan, offering a fresh perspective on coalition dynamics and breakdown mechanisms.