Optimal Design of Renewable Energy Certificate Markets: A Principal-Agent Mean Field Game Approach

Optimal Design of Renewable Energy Certificate Markets: A Principal-Agent Mean Field Game Approach

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Introduction

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1 of 19

Introduction

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Classroom Contents

Optimal Design of Renewable Energy Certificate Markets: A Principal-Agent Mean Field Game Approach

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  1. 1 Introduction
  2. 2 Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) markets
  3. 3 What problem do we address?
  4. 4 Contribution to the literature
  5. 5 Agents' (Regulated Firms) Problem in a Nutshell
  6. 6 Agents' Problem in a Nutshell
  7. 7 Agents' Problem (Mean Field Limit)
  8. 8 Principal's (Regulator's) Problem
  9. 9 Remarks on Approach
  10. 10 Find agents' best response - Overview
  11. 11 Find agents' best response Optimal Controls
  12. 12 Step 1. Agents' best response characterization
  13. 13 Re-cast principal's problem - Overview
  14. 14 Re-cast principal's problem - Reduction
  15. 15 Re-cast principal's problem - Restatement
  16. 16 Solve the re-cast problem - Overview
  17. 17 Solve the re-cast problem - Hamiltonian KY, KY represent adjoint processes, Ly represents
  18. 18 Solve the re-cast problem - Optimal penalty
  19. 19 Economic Implications

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