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PRF security in the non-uniform model
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Classroom Contents
Another Look at Provable Security
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- 1 Intro
- 2 What this talk is about
- 3 Example of a non-tight reduction The classic Bellare-Rogaway proof for RSA-FDH in the random oracle model has a tightness gap of y, where is the number of hash function queries
- 4 Identity-based encryption schemes
- 5 Does tightness matter?
- 6 MACs in the multi-user setting
- 7 Security proof for MAC* The proof is a reduction from breaking MAC1 to breaking MAC
- 8 Provably secure, but insecure
- 9 MAC* in other protocols
- 10 Single-user vs. multi-user
- 11 Bellare's security theorem for NMAC
- 12 PRF security Security assumption: f is (t,c,q)-secure. That is, adversaries
- 13 PRF security in the non-uniform model
- 14 Interpreting Bellare's proof in practice
- 15 Is HMAC-MD5 provably secure?
- 16 Non-uniform complexity model
- 17 Significance of our work
- 18 COPS: Cryptanalysis of Provable Security
- 19 A radical proposal
- 20 In conclusion....
