Wireless Attacks on Aircraft Instrument Landing Systems

Explore a critical security presentation from USENIX Security '19 focusing on wireless attacks targeting aircraft instrument landing systems (ILS). Delve into research conducted by Harshad Sathaye from Northeastern University, revealing vulnerabilities in aviation systems that have not been previously examined in open literature. Learn about the feasibility of spoofing ILS radio signals using commercially available software-defined radio (SDR) platforms, potentially causing last-minute go-around decisions and missed landings in low-visibility conditions. Discover how researchers demonstrated fine-grained control over the course deviation indicator on aviation-grade ILS receivers in real-time. Examine the potential of overshadowing attacks and lower-power single-tone attacks on aircraft landing systems. Gain insights into the development of a closed-loop ILS spoofer that adjusts transmitted signals based on aircraft GPS location, potentially causing undetected off-runway landings. Understand the systematic evaluation of these attacks against an FAA-certified flight simulator's AI-based autoland feature, demonstrating successful offset touchdowns ranging from 18 to over 50 meters.