Overview

Games or ‘Strategic Interactions’ can be found in all walks of life. Examples of such scenarios are two firms competing for market share, politicians contesting elections, different bidders participating in an auction for wireless spectrum, coal blocks etc. Game theory provides a convenient framework to model and interpret the behavior of participants in such strategic interactions. Hence it can be applied to solve a wide variety of problems involving diverse areas such as Markets, Auctions, Online Retail, Cold War, Paying Taxes, Bargaining, Elections, Portfolio Management etc. Therefore, both undergraduate and postgraduate students and professionals from diverse backgrounds such as Scientists, Engineers, Managers, Politicians and Political Scientists, Economists, Mathematicians etc will find the course content useful. Examples and exercises will be motivated by problems close to real life scenarios.

Syllabus

Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory.
Lecture 01: Practical Examples of Game Theory - Markets, Politics, Wireless Communications etc..
Lecture 02: Prisoner’s Dilemma-Introduction and Analysis.
Lecture 03: Basic Concepts of Nash Equilibrium.
Lecture 04: Prisoner’s Dilemma in Practice and Pareto Optimality.
Lecture 05: Dominant Strategy-Introduction and Examples.
Lecture 06: Coordination Games- Introduction and Analysis.
Lecture 07: Battle of Sexes- Introduction and Analysis.
Lecture-08: Tragedy of Commons- Introduction and Analysis.
Lecture 09: Tragedy of Commons- Detailed Analysis.
Lecture 10: Cournot Duopoly (competition between two firms) - Introduction and Analysis.
Lecture 11: Cournot Duopoly (competition between two firms) - Detailed Analysis.
Lecture 12: Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium.
Lecture 13: Mixed Strategies Example-Battle of Sexes.
Lecture 14: Battle of Sexes-Best Response Analysis.
Lecture 15: Mixed Strategy Example-Paying Taxes Game.
Lecture 16: Mixed Strategy Example-Portfolio Management Game.
Lecture 17: Rationality and Common Knowledge- Assumptions in Game Theory.
Lecture 18: Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies.
Lecture 19: Auctions- An Introduction and Types of Auctions.
Lecture 20: Auctions-Game Theoretic Techniques to Model an Auction.
Lecture 21: Braess’s Paradox-Modelling and Detailed Analysis.
Lecture 22: Applications of Game Theory in Real Life Scenarios- Linear Markets.
Lecture 23: Extensive Form Games- Introduction and Examples.
Lecture 24: Game Tree and Information Sets- Representing Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.
Lecture 25: Strategies in Extensive Form Games.
Lecture 26: Extensive Form Games with Simultaneous Moves and their Normal Form Representation.
Lecture 27: Sub Game Perfect Equilibrium- Need and Introduction.
Lecture 28: Solving General Extensive Form Games-Modification in Backward induction.
Lecture 29: Application of Extensive Form Games.
Lecture 30: Sub Game Perfect Equilibrium Example- Ultimatum Game.
Lecture 31: Stackelberg Leadership Model- introduction and Detailed Analysis.
Lecture 32: Bayesian Games-Introduction & Examples.
Lecture 33: Bayesian Games Application-Battle of Sexes Game.
Lecture 34: Bayesian Games Application -Battle of Sexes Game (Continued).
Lecture 35: Bayesian Games Application -Yield vs. Fight Game.
Lecture 36: Bayesian Games Application -Yield vs. Fight Game (Continued).
Lecture 37: Bayesian version of Cournot Game.
Lecture 38: Mixed Strategy Bayesian Games- An Introduction and Example.
Lecture 39: Auctions modelled as Bayesian Game.
Lecture 40: Auctions as Bayesian Games –Sealed Bid First Price.
Lecture 41: Auctions as Bayesian Games –Sealed Bid First Price (Continued).
Lecture 42: Auctions as Bayesian Games- Second Price.
Lecture 43: Auctions as Bayesian Games- Second Price (Continued).
Lecture 44: All Pay Format of Auctions- Detailed Analysis.
Lecture 45: The Problem of Hawk-Dove Games.
Lecture 46: Evolutionary Game Theory- A Deviation from Regular Game Theory.
Lecture 47: Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) - Beetles’ World Example and Analysis.
Lecture 48: Evolutionary Stable Strategy and Nash Equilibrium.
Lecture 49: Repeated Games-Introduction and Examples.
Lecture 50: Finitely Repeated Games having Multiple Equilibrium.
Lecture 51: Chain-Store Paradox- Modelling and Detailed Analysis.
Lecture 52: Infinitely Repeated Games- Need and Real World Applications.
Lecture 53: Non-Cooperative Bargaining- Different Stage Bargaining and Rubinstein’s Bargaining Model.
Lecture 54: Axiomatic (Cooperative) Bargaining- Need and Principles/ Axioms.
Lecture 55: Extensive Form Game with Incomplete Information.
Lecture 56: Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) - Modelling and Analysis.
Lecture 57: Obtaining Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Lecture 58: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Application- Gift Game.