Learn about risk-averse selfish routing in traffic networks from Evdokia Nikolova of the University of Texas at Austin in this 32-minute lecture from the Simons Institute. Explore how traffic uncertainty affects commuter behavior and congestion. Examine the price of anarchy in routing games with stochastic delays. Compare risk-averse and risk-neutral equilibria, analyzing their efficiency and characterizing them for mean-standard deviation risk models. Investigate upper bounds on the Price of Risk Aversion for various latency functions and consider implications for heterogeneous players. Gain insights into traffic modeling that accounts for commuter risk sensitivity and its impacts on network efficiency.
Overview
Syllabus
Intro
Traffic conditions are uncertain
Commuters pad travel times
Goal
Understanding traffic congestion
Price of anarchy = 4/3
Risk sensitivity of price of anarchy
Routing games with stochastic delays
Risk-averse vs Risk-neutral Equilibrium
Equilibrium characterization for mean-stdev risk
Are Risk-Averse Equilibria Efficient?
Risk-averse vs Risk-neutral equilibria
Price of Risk Aversion (PRA)
Price of Risk Aversion: Upper Bound for Arbitrary Latency Functions
Heterogeneous players
Summary
Taught by
Simons Institute
