Explore the interplay between Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) practices and emission permits in this 47-minute Dynamic Games and Applications seminar. Delve into Alessandro Tampieri's analysis of steady-state industry configurations in oligopolies comprising profit-seeking and ECSR firms within an evolutionary setting. Examine the impact of Emission Trading System (ETS) schemes on pollution regulation and firms' investments in emission abatement technology. Discover surprising findings on individual ECSR firms potentially polluting more than their profit-seeking counterparts, and how ETS introduction affects competitive dynamics. Investigate the model's components, including profit functions, environmental damage, static equilibrium, and evolutionary game theory. Assess the stringency of ETS policy and its effects on social welfare and environmental concerns, providing valuable insights into the complex relationship between corporate environmental practices and emission permit systems.
Interplay between Environmental CSR Practices and Emission Permits
GERAD Research Center via YouTube
Overview
Syllabus
Introduction
Emission trading system
Evidence of relevance
Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility
Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility
Interaction between Environmental and Social Practices
Literature
Model
Profit Function
Objective Function
Environmental Damage
Static Equilibrium
Equilibrium Features
Evolutionary Game Theory
Stringency of ETS Policy
Effects on Social Welfare
Effect on Social Welfare
Effect on Environmental Concern
Conclusion
Taught by
GERAD Research Center
