Explore a cutting-edge approach to large-scale and dynamic link-flooding defenses in this 14-minute IEEE conference talk. Delve into the innovative Mew system, designed to leverage programmable switches for enhanced network security. Learn how researchers from Texas A&M University, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, and Peng Cheng Laboratory have collaborated to develop this advanced solution. Gain insights into the system's architecture, implementation challenges, and potential impact on mitigating link-flooding attacks in modern network infrastructures.
Mew - Enabling Large-Scale and Dynamic Link-Flooding Defenses on Programmable Switches
Overview
Syllabus
Mew: Enabling Large-Scale and Dynamic Link-Flooding Defenses on Programmable Switches
Taught by
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
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