Explore a conference talk from PKC 2020 examining Generic Authenticated Key Exchange in the Quantum Random Oracle Model. Delve into the limitations of previous work, the significance of decryption failures, and the transition from the Random Oracle Model to the Quantum Random Oracle Model. Understand the 'Oneway to Hiding' technique for extracting preimages, and examine common elements in Fujisaki-Okamoto proofs. Investigate the security challenges of 2-move protocols and gain insights into the proposed security model. Conclude by considering open questions in this field of cryptographic research.
Generic Authenticated Key Exchange in the Quantum Random Oracle Model
Overview
Syllabus
Intro
Context: NIST 'competition
Prior work on AKE without signatures
Outline
Limitations of the original work
The importance of decryption failures
Random Oracle Model (ROM)
Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM)
Extracting preimages with 'Oneway to Hiding
Overview: Common ground of all current FO proofs
Transformation T
Transformation U
Simplified overview. Subsequent CCA bounds
Our setting: 2-move protocols
Attacking 2-move protocols
Our security model
Security of our protocol (Intuition)
Open questions
Taught by
TheIACR
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