Explore a cache attack on the BLISS lattice-based signature scheme in this 23-minute conference talk from CHES 2016. Delve into the Flush, Gauss, and Reload technique presented by Leon Groot Bruinderink, Andreas Hülsing, Tanja Lange, and Yuval Yarom. Gain insights into the vulnerabilities of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms and understand the potential security risks associated with cache-based side-channel attacks on lattice-based cryptography.
Flush, Gauss, and Reload - A Cache Attack on the BLISS Lattice-Based Signature Scheme
Overview
Syllabus
Flush, Gauss, and Reload A Cache Attack on the BLISS Lattice Based Signature Scheme
Taught by
TheIACR
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