Explore groundbreaking research on Rowhammer attacks and defenses in this 25-minute conference talk presented at the 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy. Delve into novel attack techniques and exploitation primitives that challenge existing countermeasures for the Rowhammer bug. Discover the innovative "one-location hammering" method that breaks previous assumptions about triggering Rowhammer, and learn about "opcode flipping" which bypasses recent isolation mechanisms. Examine the "memory waylaying" technique that exploits system-level optimizations to place target pages at specific physical locations. Understand how Intel SGX can be abused to conceal attacks from both users and operating systems. Gain insights into the potential for coordinated denial-of-service attacks in cloud environments and privilege escalation on personal computers. Evaluate the effectiveness of current Rowhammer defenses and consider the implications for future security measures in DRAM systems.
Overview
Syllabus
Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer Defenses
Taught by
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy