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Yale University

Repeated Games: Cooperation vs. The End Game - Lecture 21

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Overview

Explore the dynamics of repeated games in this Yale University lecture on game theory. Delve into the intricacies of cooperation and defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma, examining how future rewards and punishments can influence present behavior. Analyze the breakdown of cooperation in finite games and the "lame duck" effect in real-world scenarios. Investigate the concept of renegotiation and its implications, including a discussion on bankruptcy laws. Learn about the Grim Trigger strategy in potentially infinite games. Through in-class demonstrations and real-world examples, gain insights into the complexities of repeated interactions and their impact on decision-making in various contexts.

Syllabus

- Chapter 1. Repeated Interaction: Cooperation versus Defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma.
- Chapter 2. Repeated Interaction: The Breakdown of Cooperation and The Lame Duck Effect.
- Chapter 3. Repeated Interaction: Renegotiation.
- Chapter 4. Failure of Renegotiation: Bankruptcy Laws.
- Chapter 5. Repeated Interaction: The Grim Trigger Strategy.

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