Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Matchmaking and Strategic Investments - Lecture 19

Overview

Explore subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) through three game theory examples in this Yale University lecture. Analyze a trust game with three Nash equilibria, discovering how only one aligns with backward induction. Examine a matchmaking scenario, constructing multiple SPEs by rolling back equilibrium payoffs from the dating subgame. Investigate a firm's strategic investment decision, revealing the significant impact of choices on competing firms. Gain insights into game theory applications and strategic decision-making across various scenarios.

Syllabus

- Chapter 1. Sub-game Perfect Equilibria: Example.
- Chapter 2. Sub-game Perfect Equilibria: Matchmaking.
- Chapter 3. Matchmaking: SPEs of the Game.
- Chapter 4. Sub-game Perfect Equilibria: Strategic Investments.
- Chapter 5. Strategic Investments: Discussion.