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Measuring bridge reachability
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Classroom Contents
Tor and Circumvention: Lessons Learned, by Roger Dingledine
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- 1 Intro
- 2 What is Tor?
- 3 Threat model: what can the attacker do?
- 4 Anonymity isn't encryption: Encryption just protects contents.
- 5 Anonymity isn't just wishful thinking...
- 6 Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.
- 7 Law enforcement needs anonymity to get the job done.
- 8 Journalists and activists need Tor for their personal safety
- 9 Current situation: Bad people on the Internet are doing fine
- 10 The simplest designs use a single relay to hide connections.
- 11 But a single relay (or eavesdropper!) is a single point of failure.
- 12 Alice makes a session key with R1 ...And then tunnels to R2...and to R3
- 13 The basic Tor design uses a simple centralized directory protocol.
- 14 How do you find a bridge?
- 15 Attacker's goals
- 16 What we're up against
- 17 Flash is dangerous too
- 18 Publicity attracts attention
- 19 Advocacy and education
- 20 Measuring bridge reachability
- 21 Other components
