Efficiently Mitigating Transient Execution Attacks Using the Unmapped Speculation Contract

Efficiently Mitigating Transient Execution Attacks Using the Unmapped Speculation Contract

USENIX via YouTube Direct link

Redesigning the kernel to avoid switches

13 of 19

13 of 19

Redesigning the kernel to avoid switches

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Efficiently Mitigating Transient Execution Attacks Using the Unmapped Speculation Contract

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  1. 1 Intro
  2. 2 Transient execution attacks risk leaking information Linux maintains security using software mitigations
  3. 3 Software mitigations are expensive
  4. 4 Goal: faster mitigations
  5. 5 Transient execution attack example
  6. 6 Typical mitigation approach
  7. 7 Ward has a different approach
  8. 8 Our observation: Unmapped Speculation Contract (USC)
  9. 9 USC is a good hardware-software contract
  10. 10 Split kernel to leverage USC
  11. 11 Syscalls start executing in the Q-domain
  12. 12 World switches use two stacks
  13. 13 Redesigning the kernel to avoid switches
  14. 14 Allocating memory without world switches
  15. 15 Implementation
  16. 16 Ward does better on LEBench
  17. 17 Related Work: Spectrum of defenses
  18. 18 Open question: what is the best way to mitigate attacks?
  19. 19 Conclusion

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