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Strategies tell more than what players would do
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Classroom Contents
Sequential Equilibria in Infinite Extensive Form Games
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- 1 Intro
- 2 There is no sequential equilibrium when players can choose from a continuum of actions
- 3 We start from a characterization of sequential equilibrium strategy profiles
- 4 Completely mixed strategies only guarantee that all information sets are reached
- 5 We focus on multistage games
- 6 The pathologies of games with uncountable action spaces come from informational discontinuities
- 7 Our main assumption says that signal functions are continuous
- 8 Strategies tell more than what players would do
- 9 Strategies induce strategic measures
- 10 Strategic measures behave well
- 11 Probability zero events matter because which events have probability zero is endogenous
- 12 Information sets contain all past signals and all past own actions of a player
- 13 It is not that bad if a player conditions on their previous actions imperfectly
- 14 We use strategic measures that reach all observable events instead of completely mixed strategies
- 15 Sequential rationality is only tested at observable events
