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The attacker can use moar power
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Wallet.fail
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- 1 Intro
- 2 A long story short...
- 3 How is cryptocurrency stored?
- 4 What's a hardware wallet?
- 5 Security stickers
- 6 Counterfeiting is a real problem
- 7 Removing Tamper Stickers with hot air
- 8 Stickers cause confusion
- 9 Sticker Attack Takeaways
- 10 Opening Enclosures
- 11 What do you do once it's opened?
- 12 Goals for the hardware implant
- 13 When do you install an implant?
- 14 supermicro.fun - works on a breadboard
- 15 Antenna design
- 16 Is my backdoored device genuine?
- 17 The attacker can use moar power
- 18 Supply Chain Attack Takeaways - Recap
- 19 The Ledger Nano S security model
- 20 Ledger STM32 Firmware Upgrade
- 21 Ledger STM32 Bootloader
- 22 Ledger Nano S boot process
- 23 First attempt..
- 24 After more reversing..
- 25 The STM32 memory map...
- 26 Second attempt...
- 27 Ledger Nano S MCU verification
- 28 MCU verification bypassing...
- 29 Building the compressor
- 30 Public releases
- 31 Ledger Blue: Inside
- 32 Analyzing the signal
- 33 Getting training data...
- 34 How accurate is it?
- 35 Glitching - Backstory
- 36 DC 25 RECAP - Breaking Bitcoin Board
- 37 DC 25 RECAP - ChipWhisperer Glitch
- 38 Prior STM32 Security Research
- 39 STM32 Read-out Protection (RDP)
- 40 STM32F2 Boot process (1.8ms)
- 41 STM32F2 Boot process (1.4ms)
- 42 Power consumption after reset (2009)
- 43 Glitching the Trezor One
- 44 Reviewing the upgrade procedure...
- 45 Getting the seed
- 46 The Trezor Glitcher